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Editor's Brief
This issue of The Colonial Lawyer: Journal 0/ Virginia Law and Public Policy
is my second and last as Senior Editor. I leave the journal and its future in the
capable hands of Felicia Silber and her incoming editors and staff.
Public perception of the legal profession has always been ambivalent.
Everyone needs attorneys, yet everyone loves to criticize them.

They are

accused of being dishonest, or of manipulating the system for the benefit of the
wealthy and empowered.

This issue of the Lawyer contains two articles which

relate to these perceptions.
The first, by Mr. Gerbasi, discusses the use of RIC,O to seize attorney's fees
prepaid by criminal defendants.

The Federal Government seizes the fees under

the broad forfeiture provisions in RICO by alleging that they are the proceeds of
illegal activity and therefore can be forfeited just like a mansion or a Lear jet.
The purchase of legal services is not, of course, comparable to the purchase of
real estate or a consumer durable.

The seizure ignores the potential violation of

the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Mr. Gerbasi discusses the
inherent tension in relation to crime families accused of involvement in drug
traffic.
Little public sympathy is lost on those accused of being drug traffickers, and
even less is expended on their attorneys.
attorneys

who act

to

protect those

The public seems to feel that the

accused

of reprehensible acts are as

repugnant as the perpetrators of those acts.

Mr. Raby's article discusses an attempt to regulate the profession of law to
protect the public and raise the perceived quality of the industry.

Virginia's

new attorney-sanction provision, Virginia Code § 8.01-27l.1, acts in much the
same way as the existing Federal Rule 11 sanctions. Mr. Raby describes how the
new code section works and discusses how it might affect the practice of law in
Virginia.
Ms. Lewis comments on a case recently argued before the Supreme Court,

Kendrick v. Bowen.

Ms. Lewis discusses the history and policy of the Adolescent

Family Life Act which is the basis of the suit, and suggests how the Supreme
Court should address the issues raised.

The issues raised are those at the core

of modern political discussion: government policy toward abortion, the separation
of church and state, government funding of medical services.
I hope you enjoy the spring issue, and welcome any comments or thoughts
you may have.
Bruce William McDougal
Senior Editor
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TOWARD A SUNNIER DAY FOR RICO: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS OF FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES PAID BY
A CRIME FAMILY DEFENDANT
. by
Joseph S. Gerbasi
The late 1960's and early 1970's signalled the beginning of a sustained effort
by the United States Govemment to eliminate organized crime.

The executive

branch established the Department of Justice Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section, along with Department Strike Forces located in major cities, to address

..

what was perceived as a pressing national concern.

The legislative branch passed

a series of laws intended to choke off organized crime, including the 1968
Consumer Credit Protection Act" the 1968 Gun Control Act,2 and the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 3 The legislative effort culminated
1970 when Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act 4 and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 5
The two landmark
in

statutes enabled by this legislation are the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act 6 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute 7 (hereinafter
referred to as RICO and CCE).
RICO is useful in attacking highly-sophisticated, organized, and diversified
criminal activity.
racketeering

The statute prohibits: using income derived from a "pattern of

activity"

to

acquire

an

interest

in,

establish,

or

1 18 U.S.C. § 891-94 (1968) (contains provisions relating
credit transactions, i.e., loan-sharking).

operate

any

to extortionate

2 18 U.S.c. § 921-929, 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1968).
3 42 U.S.C § 3711-12 (1984) (providing in part for court-authorized
interception of wire and oral communication, and protection of federal witnesses).
4 The Act contains the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) (banning interference
with commerce by threats or violence), measures banning interstate and foreign
travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises (18 U.S.C § 1952), and
the creation of special investigating grand juries (18 U.S.c. § 3331-34), in addition
to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (I8 U.S.C. § 1961-68).
5 21 U.S.C. § 800 (1970).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1970), enabled by the Organized Crime Control Act.
7 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970),
Prevention and Control Act.

enabled

by
1

the

Comprehensive

Drug

Abuse

"enterprise" engaged in, or whose activities affect, interstate commerce;8 acquiring
an interest in an enterprise engaged in, or whose activities affect, interstate
commerce

through

a

"pattern

of

racketeering

activity";9

conducting,

or

participating in the conduct of, the affairs of an enterprise engaged in, or whose
activities

affect,

interstate

commerce

through

a

"pattern

of

racketeering

activity"; 10 or conspiring to violate any of these provisions. ll
In addition to creating an innovative framework for prosecution, Congress
created strict penal provisions for RICO. The provisions allow for forfeiture to
the government, upon conviction for a RICO offense, of any interest or asset
gained by the defendant through unlawful activity.

These forfeiture provisions,

which have identical counterparts in CCE,12 supply much of the prosecutorial
firepower found in RICO.

Both the original RICO and CCE provisions were

amended in 1984 by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. The RICO provisions state
that one found in violation of § 1962 shall forfeit to the United States:
[A]ny interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962;... any interest in ... any enterprise which the person has ... participated in the
conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and any property constituting, or
derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained directly or indirectly,
from racketeering activity .. .in violation of section 1962.1 j
Property

subject

to

forfeiture includes real property and tangible and
intangible personal propert y.I 4 The provisions state that all rights to forfeitable
property vest in the United States at the time of commission of the alleged crime
giving rise to forfeiture.

Property transferred to a third party after this time is

forfeitable unless the transferee can establish (I) that he held title to the
particular property over the defendant at the time defendant allegedly committed
the RICO violations l5 or (2) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the
8 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970) (an example of this violation is the laundering
of "dirty" money through a legitimate business).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970) (an example of this violation is the use of
extortion, fraud, murder, etc., to take control over a legitimate business).
10 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1970) (an example of this violation is the operation
of a legitimate business through unlawful means such as bribery, theats, etc.).
II 18 U.S.C § 1962(d) (I970).
12 21 U.S.C. § 848, 853 (1984).
13 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (I9lS4).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(A) (1984).
2

property, who at the time of transfer was reasonably without cause to believe the
property was subject to forfeiture.I 6 The forfeiture provisions can apply postconviction, to assets previously transferred by the defendant to a third party, and
pretrial, by the issuance of a restraining order freezing defendant's assets pending
outcome of the trial. 17
In light of organized crime's heavy reliance on legal talen t,l8 a critical issue
is the application of the RICO forfeiture provisions to the attorneys' fees paid by
a defendant who is a member of an organized crime syndicate, or crime family.
This article will examine whether applying the RICO forfeiture provisions pretrial
to property or funds a crime family defendant intends to transfer to an attorney
as legal fees or post-conviction to property or funds he has transferred to an
attorney as legal fees deprives that defendant of the right to counsel guaranteed
by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution.

The article will

analyze the RICO forfeiture provisions, which are applied to the widest variety of
organized crime cases, but will raise both RICO and CCE cases because the
forfeiture ,provisions in each are identical.
Because each presents the identical issue in sixth amendment terms, postconviction forfeiture and pretrial restraining orders are treated interchangeably.
The article concludes that this application does not violate the right to counsel
due to both the unique relationship between the crime family defendant and his
attorney and the availability of appointed, counsel.

I propose a revision to the

traditional method of appointing counsel in such cases in order to safeguard both
the right of the crime family defendant to the assistance of counsel and the
interest of the government in gaining forfeiture of illicit profits to the full
extent consistent with the purposes underlying forfeiture.
My proposal is limited to crime family defendants (what most think of as
"the Mafia") and their attorneys.

Crime family defendants may be identified by

pretrial judicial determination pursuant to an adversarial hearing. The government
can present evidence of the defendant's involvement in unlawful crime family
activity, with the defendant having the opportunity to present evidence in
rebuttal.

Virtually all crime families in major cities are well-known to law

enforcement and judicial officials.

If the indictment in a case alleges that the

defendant is part of a larger group engaging in illegal activities, as with a RICO
conspiracy charge, or if investigations reveal that he has no legitimate sources of
income, this may create an inference that he is a crime family member if
additional

corroborating

facts

so

indicate.

16 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B) (1984).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(I) (1984).
18 See infra note 44.
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. Cases

and

commentators

have

frequently addressed the constitutionality of forfeiture of attorneys' fees of a
RICO or CCE defendant generally, but have never focused solely on a crime
family

defendant.

Indeed, defendant's status as a crime family "member"

contributes significantly to the finding that forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not
infringe on his right to counsel.
BACKGROUND
RICO
The critical terms of RICO have been broadly defined. "Racketeering
activity" is defined to mean any of the eight state crimes l9 or twenty-four
federal crimes 20 serving as predicate RICO offenses, and is established by proving
the necessary elements of the relevant crimes.

"Enterprise" is defined to mean

essentially any individual or association of individuals,21 and is established by
evidence of an ongoing organization whose associates function as a continuing
unit. 22 "Pattern of racketeering activity" is defined to mean a series of two or
more predicate criminal acts committed within ten years of one another, at least
one of which was committed after October 15, 1970. It is established by evidence
of two or more of the relevant crimes committed by members of the enterprise
within the-requisite time frame. 23
Purposes oj RICO
The purposes of RICO are to "provide new weapons of unprecedented scope
for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots."24

The Statement of

Findings prefacing the Organized Crime Control Act states that in prior studies
and investigations, Congress had found organized crime in the United States to be
a highly-sophisticated, multi-faceted activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from the economy through unlawful conduct and social exploitation. 25
Congress also reported that organized crime activities weaken the U.S. economic
system by cutting competition, burden commerce, threaten domestic security, and
19 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(a) (1970)..
20 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(b) (1970).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970).
22 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
23 Id.
24 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
25 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, PUb. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
923 (1970) (noted in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1981».
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undermine the general welfare of all citizens. 26

Congress found that organized

crime continues to grow due to the limited scope and impact of traditional
sanctions and remedies available to the government. 27
In light of such findings, Congress declared its purpose' "to seek the
eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal
tools"28 used against those engaged in organized crime.
full-scale attack on organized crime."29

It sought to mount "a

"What is needed ... are new approaches

that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through
which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic wellbeing of the Nation.

In short, an attack must be made on their source of

economic power itself... "30

RICO is a comprehensive statute, intended to give the

federal government powerful tools with which to pursue the rampant problem of
organized crime.

The vague terms of the statute, together with their broad

judicial interpretations, allow federal prosecutors wide range in bringing actions
against a gamut of organized crime activity.

Unlike CCE, which is primarily

limited to individuals who manage or organize narcotics-producing or distributing
enterprises, RICO is a versatile weapon in the federal prosecutorial arsenal.
Purposes of RICO Forfeiture
The unique feature of the forfeiture provisions is their in personam
operation.

Traditionally, all forfeiture provisions in the U.S. were civil in nature

and operated in rem, against the property of defendant. The property was viewed
as the offending party.

Under RICO, the defendant is viewed as the offending

party and forfeiture of the property is triggered only by his conviction.

In

personam provisions were unprecedented in the U.S. until RICO, even though they,
were known to the common law of England and the colonies. 31
Congress' utilization of a revolutionary approach evidences the special
legislative intent supporting the RICO forfeiture provisions.

If the intent behind

RICO is to eradicate organized crime, then the forfeiture provisions are intended
to achieve this result by enabling the government to erode the economic base of
organized crime. "[T]he forfeiture provision was intended to serve all the aims of
26 Id.
27 Id.

28 Id.

29 116 CONGo REC. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough).
30 Id. at 35193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).

31 Note, Criminal RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: "Rough"
Justice Is Not Enough, 14 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 451, 457 (1987).
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the

RICO

statute .. ."32

and

represents

an

effort

to

"

develop

enforcementmeasures at least as efficient as those of organized crime."33

law

During

the Senate debates prior to the enactment of RICO, one supporter announced:
While prosecutions and convictions of leaders of organized crime and their
confederates are increasing each year .. .it is becoming increasingly apparent
that such convictions alone, which simply remove the leaders from control of
the
syndicate-owned enterprises but do not attack the vested property
interests whose control passes on to other Cosa Nostra leaders, are not
adequate to demolish the structure of the surviving organizations which they
run. 34
Prior to the 1984 amendment of the RICO forfeiture provisions, the Senate
Judiciary

Committee remarked

that

the

Comprehensive

Forfeiture Act

was

"designed to enhance the use of...criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in
combatting
racketeering

two
and

of

the
drug

most

serious

trafficking .. .it

[racketeering] is sustained and grows."35

crime
is

problems
through

facing

economic

the

country:

power

that

The Committee went on to comment

that conviction of individual racketeers under RICO would be meaningless if "the
economic power bases of criminal organization or enterprises were left intact."36
The forfeiture provisions were promulgated in order to effectuate RICO's purpose
by stripping crime families of their economic power}7

An earlier Senate Report

echoes this goal by indicating that the RICO remedies seek to divest crime family
kingpins of their economic sources of power in order to choke off the family and
free the channels of commerce from racketeering influence. 38 The Supreme Court
has joined this consensus by stating that the goal of RICO forfeiture is to remove
the profit from organized crime by separating the crime family kingpin from his
32 116 CONGo REC. 18955 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
33 Id. at 35199 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
34 Id. at 607 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).

35 S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Con g., 1st Sess. 191-192, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374.
36 Id.

37 In the early 1930's, violence between gangs of Sicilian and Neapolitan
immigrants caused gang leaders to devise a plan of organization for crime in the
U.S.
The existing gangs became recognized as families, each with its own
hierarchy of leadership and territorial limits. 116 CONGo REC. 598 (1970) (citing
cover story of Time of August 22, 1969).
38 S. REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969).

6

unlawful gains.3 9

By taking the profit out of organized crime, the forfeiture

provisions would also act as a "mighty deterrent to any further expansion of
organized crime's economic power."40

In the face of the relative impotence of

the traditional sanctions of fine and imprisonment, forfeiture diversifies and
strengthens federal prosecutorial weapons designed to fight organized crime by
enabling the government to strip the crime family of the fruits of unlawful
activities.

Courts believe that forfeiture is the only effective penalty against the

crime family defendant, holding that if the defendant is fined or incarcerated but
his "family" is left with the economic vestiges of his unlawful acts, the defendant
could manage the organization by proxy from prison, or successors could Quickly
climb the hierarchical ladder within the family and cQntinue illegal activities. 41
DISCUSSION

Scope of RICO Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment
Judicial interpretation of the breadth of the RICO forfeiture provisions
determines the scope of their effectiveness in destroying the economic base
supporting crime families.

The demand for high-quality legal services by crime

families is intensely high.

Many attribute the longevity and prosperity of crime
families to their ability to command high-quality legal talent 42 and to the ability
of their attorneys to repeatedly win sanctions of fines and short prison sentences.
These sanctions are ineffective against organized crime because of the seemingly
endless supply of cash and new managerial talent within crime families. 43
Attorneys are the "lifeblood" of organized crime and have become a "critical
39 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983).
40 116 CONGo REC. 607 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).

41 See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979).
42 See In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th
Cir. 1988).
43 ".. .in the past five years the 25 major identified traditional organized
crime groups in the country have had 75 separate changes in leadership-28
resulting from prosecutions. Yet, to our knowledge not a single one of these
groups has broken up as a result of the change in leadership." Forfeiture of
Narcotics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1980) (statement of Irving
B. Nathan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department
of Justice). See also Dombrink and Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use
and Abuse of RICO, 16 Rutgers L.J. 633, 635-636 (1985).
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element

in

the

life

support

system

of

organized

crime."44

"It

is

clear

thattraditional organized crime ... depend[s] upon, and could not effectively operate
without, these attorneys."45
The

plain

language of

§l963 calls

for

forfeiture

of

any
defendant gained in violation of the substantive section of RICO. 4 6

interest the

history gives an equally broad interpretation of forfeitable interests.

The Senate

Legislative

Judiciary Committee wrote that the language of the forfeiture provisions "is
designed to accomplish a forfeiture of any interest of any type in the [unlawful]
enterprise... "47

The Supreme Court has held that forfeiture applies to any

interest traceable to racketeering activity, including cash profits as well as
ownership interests in an enterprise. 48 The Court reasoned that a broad reading
of "interest" is consistent with the pattern of RICO in using broad terms and
concePts,49 and that Congress would have expressly limited forfeitable interests in
the statute if it had so intended. 50 A broad interpretation allows the government
to defeat transactions where a defendant transfers assets or income gained
through racketeering activity to a third party for concealment in order to avoid
forfeiture.

This interpretation best achieves the purposes of the forfeiture

provisions to erode the economic power of organized crime by mandating
forfeiture of any form such power could take.
"Any interest" is a concept broad enough to include assets or funds gained
through illegal activity and paid as attorneys' fees.

However, many courts and

commentators claim that requiring post-conviction forfeiture of attorneys' fees or
allowing the issuance of a pretrial restraining order freezing a defendant's assets
infringes on the sixth amendment right to counsel. 51
44 Lawyers Called Organized Crime "Li/e Support", 193 N.Y.L.J. 1 (March II,
1985) (quoting 1985 staff report of the President's Commission on Organized Crime).
45 [d. (referring to the small
representing crime family defendants).

group

of

lawyers

deeply

involved

in

46 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(I) (1970).
47 S. REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 79 (1969).
48 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
49 [d. at 21, 27 (citing a portion of legislative history which states: "The
provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947
(1970».

50 [d. at 23.
51 United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp.
194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a/I'd on other grounds, 794 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1986).
8

The Deterrence Theory
The federal courts are split on the sixth amendment propriety of applying
the RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees.
notdecided the issue.

The Supreme Court has

None of the cases establishes a general rule concerning a

crime family defendant.
The law is clear on a single point.

Property or funds transferred or

contracted to be transferred to an attorney as part of a sham or fraudulent
transaction, where the transfer is fraudulently disguised as a fee payment and the
attorney is being used as a haven for concealing forfeitable property, must be
forfeitable in order to prevent the dissipation of unlawfully-acquired assets. 52
This interpretation preserves the forfeiture goal of stripping the racketeer of his
illicit economic gains.

The split in the case law develops concerning the

forfeitability of legitimately-paid attorneys fees.
As a first step, the nature of the sixth amendment must be briefly examined.
The amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."53

Implicit in this basic

guarantee is the right of a non-indigent to retain counsel of choice,54 out of
one's private resources and free of governmental interference. 55 However, the
right to counsel of choice is qualified - it must give way when required by the
fair administration of justice 56 and· by the purposes of the criminal forfeiture
statutes. 57 Unlike the basic right to the assistance of counsel, the right is not
absolute and "... cannot be used merely as a manipulative monkey wrench."58
One line of authority has held that the forfeiture of bona fide attorneys'
fees under RICO violates the sixth amendment because the threat of fee forfeiture
will deter attorneys from defending RICO cases.

Allegedly, an attorney will be·

reluctant to take on a case if he knows that his fee will be forfeited if his client
is convicted.

Some courts have engaged in bootstrapping, holding that because of

the deterrent potential and subsequent chill on sixth amendment rights, Congress
52 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308
(D. Md. 1986).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
55 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,923 (4th Cir. 1987).
56 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 250 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
57 United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1558 (D. Utah 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
58 Gandy v. State of Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978).
9

never intended the forfeiture provisions to apply to bona fide attorneys' fees. 59
Other courts have found that Congress clearly intended forfeiture to apply to
attorneys' fees, but that such application violates the sixth amendment due to the
deterrent factor. 60
In United States v. Badalamenti, 61 the district court held that Congress
never intended forfeiture to encompass attorneys' fees.

However, the court

considered the attorney rendering bona fide legal services to be on notice that
property or funds received as fees derived from unlawful activity and were
subject to· forfeiture. 62
Therefore, according to § 1963(m)(6)(B), the bona fide
purchaser exception, the court would find attorneys' fees to be within the scope
of forfeiture.

In United States v. Rogers, the district court concluded similarly,

yet conceded that the forfeiture provisions are clear in stating that all proceeds
of racketeering activity traceable to that activity are potentially forfeitable. The
court added that - fees paid to an attorney become the property of the attorney
and cease to be the property of defendant. 63 Because forfeiture can operate only
against the property of defendant, the court reasoned that attorneys fees must
no·t be subject to forfeiture.

However, this logic ignores the central reason for

the forfeiture provisions, which is to prevent a defendant from avoiding forfeiture
by transferring property to his attorney in a sham fee payment. The court found
that Congress intended forfeiture to apply exclusively to sham attorney fee
payments.

The court relied on a portion of the report of the Senate Judiciary

Committee issued prior to the 1984 amendment of the forfeiture provisions: "The
provision should be construed to deny relief [only] to third parties acting as
nominees of the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent
transactions;n64
But the Rogers court unilaterally inserted the bracketed word of limitation,
when the passage as a whole gives no indication that attorneys' fees should be
59 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a/I'd
on other grounds, 794 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985).
60 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,926 (4th Cir. 1987).
61 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a/I'd on
other grounds, 794 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1986).
62 [d. at 196.

63 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346.
64 S. REP.
NO. 225, 98th Con g., 2d Sess. 209 n.47 (1984).

10

forfeitable only when paid in the course of fraud. 65

Additionally, the Rogers

court noted that § 1963 does not expressly provide for the forfeiture of assets
legitimately transferred to attorneys, arguing that this interpretation does not
exempt from forfeiture assets transferred to an attorney as part of a sham.

But

if the court is going to indulge this type of logic, it could just as easily conclude
that all attorneys' fees should be subject to forfeiture, because § 1963 makes no
express mention of attorneys' fees at all.
In United

States v. Bassett, 66 the district court held that the sixth

amendment prevented the CCE forfeiture provisions from applying to bona fide
attorneys' fees.

However, this case is factually unique.

CCE applies chiefly to

drug-trafficking and does not encompass the wide variety of organized crime
activities contemplated by RICO.
attorneys'

fees

paid

by a CCE

Failing to apply forfeiture to legitimate
defendant does

not

undermine the

policy

considerations present in RICO regarding the elimination of all of organized
crime.

Hence, it is more plausible to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture in a

CCE case.

The court did not find deterrence as the reason for the sixth

amendment violation but found it in the fact that if the attorneys withdrew from
the case, the defendants would be without counsel less than two months before
trial.

Even if new defense counsel could be secured on such short notice for a

complex case, there would be insufficient time to prepare.
That Congress never intended the RICO forfeiture provisions to apply to
attorneys' fees can also be rebutted by reference to the line of cases holding that
Congress did in fact intend such an application but that it conflicts with the
sixth amendment due to the deterrence theory.67

The courts in Harvey and

Nichols found that the plain language of §1963, which fails to mention attorneys'
fees in any context, combined with the lack of contrary legislative intent,
indicates that Congress intended such payments to be subject to the same
conditions for exemption provided for all forfeitable property by § 1963(m)(6)(A)
and (B).68
in

Legislative history indicates that the concept of forfeitable property
§ 1963 is to be broadly construed. 69
Because Congress clearly intended

attorneys' fee payments to be within the concept of forfeiture, only the sixth
amendment question remains unresolved.
65 See Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE
Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493,501 (1986) (emphasis added).
66 United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986).
67 See supra note 59.
68 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 913; Nichols, 841 F.2d at _ _.
69 S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1984).
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The courts holding that fee forfeiture violates the sixth amendment rely on
the deterrence argument.

In support of this, the Rogers court cited a statement

of the House Judiciary Committee prior to the 1984 amendments to the forfeiture
provisions: "[N]othing in this section .. .is intended to interfere with a person's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel."70

However, the next sentence of the report

states: "[T]he Committee ... does not resolve the conflict in District Court opinions
on ... a

person's right to retain counseL" 71

This statement demonstrates that

Congress did not intend to resolve the sixth amendment question, but intended to
lea ve it to the courts.
The Harvey court found a sixth amendment violation by reasoning that fee
forfeiture impedes a defendant's ability to pay an attorney and chills his access
to private counsel, thereby violating the right to counsel of choice.

The court

explicitly found no violation of defendant's "basic" sixth amendment right not to
be denied counsel. 72
The court misplaced its focus and failed to properly
recognize the qualified nature of the right to counsel of choice.

The court

asserts that the right to be represented by private counsel is the "primary"
component. of the sixth amendment.

However, other courts have explicitly

announced that the right to counsel of choice may be permissibly infringed when
required by the fair administration of justice and by the purposes underlying
criminal forfeiture. 73 In the crime family context, the purposes underlying the
RICO forfeiture provisions strongly justify denying the right of a crime family
defendant to retain counsel of choice.

In enacting RICO, Congress sought to

address what two decades of investigations indicated was a major national problem
requiring immediate legislative action. Congress recognized the need for a method
of eroding the economic infrastructure supporting crime family growth. Forfeiture
. is the only effective way to divest the crime family of its economic power
because it forces the family to disgorge illicit profits.

Finding that bona fide

attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture is needed to fulfill the purpose of RICO
of obliterating organized crime.

This strongly justifies any incidental chilling
effect on the ability of a crime family defendant to hire private counse1. 74 A
permissible

sixth

amendment

infringement

occurs,

not

an

unconstitutional

deprivation of the basic right not to be denied counsel.
70 H.R. REP. NO. 845, 98th Con g., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 19 n.l (1984).
71 [d.
72 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
73 See supra notes 55 and 56.
74 See United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74,80-81 (2d Cir. 1987).
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A violation of the right to counsel of choice, when warranted by one of
these overriding considerations, is not unconstitutional.

Indeed, the statement of

the House Judiciary Committee cited by the Rogers court, together with the
subsequent sentence, shows that Congress intended forfeiture to honor only the
basic right to counsel.

The effects on the right to counsel of choice were to be

resolved by the courts.

By its logic, the Harvey court would imply that appointed

counsel is inadequate to satisfy the sixth amendment.
rejected this idea. 75
The district court

in

Nichols

stated

Courts have consistently

that fulfilling

the

goals of

the

racketeering statutes does not justify limiting defendant's admittedly Qualified
right to counsel of choice because legitimate payment of attorneys' fees does not
contribute to criminal activity.

This is untrue in the crime family context

because it is the perpetual generation of cash that allows crime families to
prosper and to diversify their criminal operations. 76 The court also held that it
would not undermine the racketeering laws' purpose to exempt from forfeiture
funds or property reasonably necessary for defendant to pay attorneys' fees, even
if defendant were found guilty on the racketeering charge and had used profits
from the unlawful activity to pay his lawyer.

However, if the government seeks

to punish a defendant for a crime which produced "tainted" profits, it should not
be willing to let him use them to hire a lawyer. This is identical to allowing him
to keep the fruits of his racketeering activity.77

The Jones court suggested that

the fact that the attorney gives bona fide legal services should overcome any
notion of fee forfeiture.1 8 But the legitimacy of the services rendered is no
reason 'to allow a crime family defendant to use the attorney as a conduit for
hiding forfeitable assets.

This conclusion exempts a transfer based solely on

legitimacy of services rendered rather than on the transferee's knowledge of the
forfeitability of the assets transferred.

This creates an exception to forfeiture

outside of the Bona Fide Purchaser (BFP) exception contained in the provisions
themselves.

It also encourages the proliferation of an intimate attorney-crime

75 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637
(4th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan.2, 1985, 605 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
76 Friedman, et. aI., Fighting Organized Crime: Special Re!ponses to a
Special Problem, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 439, 455-56 (1985).

77 See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979) (equating the transfer of economic power to attorneys
with the retention of economic power by the crime family).
78 United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1988)
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family relationship already typifying many crime families. 79

This directly

undermines the goal of stripping illegally-gained economic power from crime
families.
The

principal

reason

why

deterrence cannot

support

finding

a

sixth

amendment violation when attorneys' 'fees paid by a crime family defendant are
subject to RICO forfeiture is revealed by the unique relationship existing, in
reality, between members of a crime family and their attorneys. Any reasons why
an attorney may be deterred by the prospect of losing his fees from representing
an ordinary RICO defendant do not exist in the crime family context. There is a
remarkable trend for crime families to depend on a very small number of lawyers
for all of their legal advice and representation.

In 1985, the staff report of the

President's Commission on Organized Crime found that "a small group of lawyers"
have become critically important to the survival of crime families. 80 The chief
reason for this is because crime families are understandably secretive, and
distrustful of "outsiders."
they do not know.

They are reluctant to open their doors to those whom

The result is that this small number of lawyers comprises

people who devote much, if not all, of their· time to advising and representing
crime families.

They perform roles similar to those of house counsel in major

corporations, and are rarely paid on a per-case fee basis.
be in the form of large annual retainers.

Compensation tends to

Rarely, then, will a "crime family

attorney" be deterred from representing a client in a RICO case simply by the
prospect of losing what would ordinarily be viewed as a fee payment.

Any

payment he receives during the course of a particular case is likely no more than
a bonus coming outside of his normal retainer-style compensation.
There is a line of authority offering several compelling reasons why applying
the

RICO forfeiture

provisions to attorneys' fees, either post-conviction or

pretrial. presents no sixth amendment problem. The cases uniformly indicate that
nothing

in either the language or legislative history of

exemption of attorneys fees of any type.

§ 1963

calls for an

They emphasize that the canons of

professional responsibility require an attorney to represent a criminal defendant
zealously despite the risk of not receiving compensation. 81 thereby minimizing the
possibility of deterrence.

Additionally. courts have held that attorneys' fees

forfeited to the government may be distributed back to an attorney. in the
79 See supra note 44.
80 [d.

81 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2. 1985. 605 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds. 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(c)(I) and DR
7-10 I(A)(2)( 1980».
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amount of a reasonable fee, upon petition to the court. 82

The existence of this

avenue of relief forecloses all reasonable possibility that attorneys will be
deterred from representing crime family defendants facing RICO charges.
In addition, crime families frequently use attorneys as conduits through
which to launder money or as harbors for the safekeeping of illegally-obtained
funds or property.83

These sham transfers are disguised as attorneys' fee

payments, and courts have emphasized that an important goal of the forfeiture
provIsIons is to block such bogus transactions 84 and to prevent the dissipation of
forfeitable assets. 85
A rule limiting forfeiture of attorneys' fees to sham
transactions would require differentiation between a bona fide fee payment and a
sham payment. This distinction cannot always be accurately made.
The district court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena added: "In the same manner
that a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls Royce with the fruits of a crime, he
cannot ... obtain the services of the Rolls Royce of attorneys from these same
tainted funds."86

This reflects the argument that a defendant has no sixth

amendment right to pay an attorney with the proceeds of illicit activity.87
Monsanto

the

second

circuit

supported

this

conclusion

by

stating

that

In
a

discrimination problem would be created if an otherwise indigent defendant was
allowed to use large sums of money gained through illegal activity to retain highpriced counsel, while an indigent defendant who committed a crime producing no
such spoils was denied this benefit. 88
Sections (m)(6)(A) and (B) create two exceptions to the general rule that
forfeitable property or funds transferred to a third party after commission of the
act giving rise to forfeiture are themselves subject to forfeiture.

The third party

may keep the property or funds if he can establish that at the time of
commission of the allegedly unlawful acts he had title to the property or funds
superior to that of defendant; or if he can establish that he is a BFP for value of
82 United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453, 456 (W.O. Pa. 1986).
83 See supra note 44.
84 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F.
Supp. at 850 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
85 In re Forfeiture Hearing a~ to Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 643
(4th Cir. 1988).
86 See supra note 81.
87 Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 646 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Brickey,
"The sixth amendment guarantees only the right to use legitimate assets to obtain
the assistance of counsel. If the defendant has no assets, the sixth amendment
requires the appointment of counseL" 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 553 (1986».
88 Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 85 (2d Cir. 1987).
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the property or funds who at the time of transfer was reasonably without cause
to believe the property or funds were subject to forfeiture.

"Purchasers" applies
to providers of legal services as well as to other transferees for value. 89
These are the sole exceptions to forfeiture contained in the provisions.

The

attorney will never be able to satisfy the "superior title" exception simply because
he would have to show that he had title over defendant in the funds or property
which defendant gained through allegedly unlawful activity. The only party with
superior title to defendant at the relevant point in time will be the victim of the
allegedly unlawful activity, not defendant's attorney. Similarly, the attorney will
never be able to meet the BFP exception due to the nature of his relationship
with the crime family client. Courts have held that the indictment alone puts the
attorney on notice of the forfeitability of defendant's assets 90 and have viewed
the attorney rendering bona fide legal services as being in position to be on
notice of the forfeitability of property or funds. 91 The attorney representing a
crime

family

defendant

will

be on

perpetual "constructive

notice" of

the

forfeitability of his client's assets and the funds out of which his fee was paid
due, to the dynamics of the relationship between a crime family and the attorneys
it employs.

Most attorneys representing crime families do so on an ongoing and

comprehensive basis and possess ·an intimate knowledge of the family'S internal
affairs. 92 It is difficult to comprehend a crime family RICO case where defense
counsel is without notice that his client's assets have derived from unlawful
activity and are subject to forfeiture. 93
Because he

me~ts

neither exception, an attorney rendering bona fide legal

services to a crime family defendant will always be subject to fee forfeiture,
according to the terms of the statute.

This means that finding a transfer of

property or funds as legitimate attorneys' fees to be exempt from forfeiture,
given that deterrence of representation is too tenuous a sixth amendment claim in
the crime family context, is to create a new exception entirely unwarranted by
the text of RICO. It creates a loophole for an attorney to avoid forfeiture which
he otherwise would never be able to avoid. It also directly controverts the

89 See United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 915 (4th Cir. 1987).
90 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 605 F. Supp. at 849-50, rev'd on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (following United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d
476,471 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984».
91 See supra note 60.
92 See supra note 44.

93 See generally United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. at 1556 n.21; United
States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
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legislative intent behind forfeiture by creating a situation where a crime family is
able to avoid being stripped of the economic power gained through racketeering
activity.
Appointment of Counsel

Despite the weakness of the claim that fee forfeiture violates the right to
counsel by deterring attorneys from defending crime family clients facing RICO
charges, a solution is available to guarantee defendant's sixth amendment rights in
case any potential for deterrence exists.

He could simply retain an attorney with

funds not gained through illicit activity and therefore not subject to forfeiture.
If no untainted funds are available, the appointment of counsel will safeguard
defendant's sixth amendment rights.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides that counsel shall be appointed by
the court to a defendant who is "financially unable to obtain counsel" after the
court has advised defendant that he has a right to be represented by counsel and
that counsel may be appointed if he cannot afford it.94 Appointed counsel may
be furnished by private firms, bar associations, legal aid agencies, or defender
associations. 95 The purpose of appointed counsel is to fulfill the sixth amendment
rights of those financially unable to do so through private counsel.96

The

Criminal Justice Act must not be used to prevent defendants able to afford
counsel from exercising that privilege. 97
Courts have unanimously upheld appointed counsel as sufficient to satisfy the
sixth amendment. 98 The Supreme Court in Powell held, on right to counsel and
due process grounds, that a defendant in a capital case' has a right to appointed
counsel.

The necessary implication is that appointed counsel satisfies the sixth

amendment.

The Court in Gideon held that the right to appointed counsel applies

to any defendant charged with a felony; the implication is the same.

In United

States v. Bello,99 the court found that appointment of counsel fulfills the right to

counsel.

Clearly, appointed and

retained counsel

are equivalent

in

sixth

amendment terms.
Courts have consistently held in RICO cases that the appointment of counsel
fulfills defendant's sixth amendment rights when fee forfeiture renders him unable
94 18 U.S.c. § 3006A(b) (1982).
95 18 U.S.C § 3006A(a) (1982).
96 See United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. at 1558-59.

97 [d.

98 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
99 United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
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to retain private counsel, either due to a pretrial freeze on assets lOO or a postconviction forfeiture order allegedly deterring future representation. lOI
The

Caplin and Drysdale court held that the sixth amendment guarantees simply the
basic right to representation, which is to be represented by either retained or
appointed counsel.

Forfeiture therefore cannot threaten sixth amendment rights
when appointed counsel is available. l02 In Nichols, the tenth circuit found no

violation of the right to counsel in a similar situation when appointed counsel is
available. l03
The fourth circuit raised an additional argument in Harvey by
claiming that appointed counsel is no answer to the sixth amendment problem
created by fee forfeiture because the "available force of public defenders.. .is
insufficient to provide [sixth amendment] assurance."104 However, the number of
public defenders available to serve as appointed counsel is not so grave a problem
as to create constitutional concerns.
of appointed counseLl 05

Neither are public defenders the sole source

The argument concerning the quality of appointed

counsel was rejected by the fourth circuit in Caplin and
implicit holdings of Powell and Gideon.

Dry~dale

and by the

The Caplin and Drysdale court rejected

the notion of appointed counsel being presumptively unqualified for complex
racketeering cases, claiming that such an idea would lead to "the absurd result
that the government could not prosecute racketeers with no funds in their
possession." I 06
Regardless, the right to counsel assures only the fact of representation and
the Constitution reflects the "harsh reality that the quality of a defendant's
representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money
can buy."107

Even if appointed counsel were of lower quality than retained

counsel, no constitutional problem would exist.
The Harvey court argues that the availability of appointed counsel for RICO
defendants is of little consolation because of the catch-22 created when a
defendant does not qualify for appointed counsel because he possesses untainted
100 United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
994 (1985).
101 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987).
102 See supra note 78.

103 Nichols, 841 F.2d at _ _
104 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 921.
105 See supra note 95.

106 /d. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984».
107 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. I, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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funds sufficient to hire counsel, yet cannot hire a lawyer because attorneys may
be deterred from representing a client whose assets are subject to forfeiture. 108
However, this argument rests on faulty logic.

Attorneys will not be deterred

from representing a client when they know that the client possesses untainted
assets out of which to pay legal fees.

But in crime family cases an attorney may

not want to take any chance at all of losing his fees.

He may be deterred even

if some of defendant's assets are subject to forfeiture because of his knowledge
that most assets of a crime family member are likely to be tainted.

The catch-22

then rests on the validity of the deterrence theory, which has been shown not to
apply in the crime family context due to the nature of the attorney-crime family
relationship.
However, even if any potential exists for a crime family defendant to be
caught in this catch-22, where he is rendered defacto indigent by the forfeiture
order but is not dejure indigent, a solution exists.

Rather than resolve the

question as the Harvey court did, which was to hold that a sixth amendment
violation existed and that forfeiture could not apply to attorneys' fee payments, a
solution exists whereby defendant's sixth amendment rights can be fulfilled while
still applying forfeiture to the attorneys' fees and thereby eroding the crime
family'S tainted economic base to the maximum amount. The forfeiture provisions
should be amended to allow for counsel to be appointed to an alleged crime family
defendant facing these circumstances.
The catch-22 is unique to the crime family defendant because it is when
representing this type of client that the attorney most likely fears losing his fee
even when the defendant possesses assets not subject to forfeiture.

Creating a

"RICO crime family exception" to the traditional rules for appointing counsel in
criminal cases according to the Criminal Justice Act specifically avoids any
potential problem a crime family defendant may face in acquiring counsel, while
still allowing the government to pursue attorneys' fees under RICO foi-feiture.
This plan accords full respect to the sixth amendment. It gives the government
the greatest opportunity to erode the economic foundation of crime families and
to eradicate organized crime. This is the clear purpose of forfeiture and of RICO
as a whole.
Singling out crime family defendants for special treatment is justified. In an
equal protection context, a crime family member does not qualify as a member of
a "suspect" class, and a distinction between defendants who are members of crime
families and those who are not must bear only some rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest. 109 Allowing forfeiture of attorneys' fees paid
108 See supra note 101.
109 McDonald v. Board of Election, 349 U.S. 802, 809 (1968).
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by a crime family defendant serves the legitimate governmental interest in
eradicating organized crime embodied in RICO by forcing the sacrifice of interests
'gained through unlawful acts.

In addition, this interpretation of the RICO
forfeiture provisions suffers no other constitutional infirmities. IIO The special
treatment is not only constitutional, but its purpose is to guarantee constitutional
rights.

RICO represents a concerted effort between the executive and legislative

branches to destroy organized crime, and Congress envisioned criminal forfeiture
as the most efficient way to deteriorate the substantial economic bases supporting
crime family empires. If Congress targets the law towards a particular group, the
judiciary is justified in applying the law to that group in a unique way.
Amending the RICO forfeiture provisions to provide for appointed counsel to
defacto indigent crime family defendants serves both the defendant and the goals
of RICO.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown that in the unique case of the crime family defendant
facing RICO charges, the government is permitted by both the language and
legislative history of the statute and by the Constitution to pursue forfeiture of
attorneys' fee payments in both a pretrial and post-conviction posture.

RICO

affords no special protection from forfeiture to attorneys or to attorneys' fees.
Due to the unique nature of the relationship between a crime family defendant
and his attorney,
of fee forfeiture.

th~

latter will not be deterred from representation by the threat

The availability of appointed counsel in such cases guarantees

defendant'S sixth amendment rights.

Amending the RICO forfeiture provisions to

allow for appointed counsel when a crime family defendant is not dejure indigent
but is rendered defacto indigent by the forfeiture order eliminates any potential
sixth amendment infringements associated with forfeiture of attorneys' fees.
Creation of a "RICO crime family exception" serves both the sixth amendment and
the purposes underlying RICO forfeiture.
While the government may incur the cost of appointing an attorney in order
to be able to pursue forfeiture of attorneys' fees, this is not a question of
110 Post-conviction deprivation of an attorney's property interest in
legitimately-paid fees presents no procedural due process violation for the
attorney. The deprivation will not occur unless the government can show at the
pretrial adversarial hearing that the defendant is a crime family member. This
affords sufficient procedural due process to the attorney in danger of losing his
fees. ' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 345 (1975) (holding that procedural due
process is satisfied when the petitioner has an effective means of communicating
his case to the decision-maker before the deprivation). Issuance of a pretrial
restraining order freezing defendant's assets and preventing him from paying an
attorney presents no procedural due process violation for the attorney for the
same reasons.
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spending a dollar in order to earn one.

By winning forfeiture of attorneys' fees,

the government obtains the additional advantage of forcing a defendant to forego
illicit profits, thereby helping to dissolve the foundation of economic strength
supporting organized crime.
In Caplin and Drysdale the fourth circuit recognized the need to defer to
Congressional will concerning the problems RICO seeks to address. I I I

The court

states that a ban on fee forfeiture, in addition to restricting the scope of
Congress's efforts to solve the organized crime problem, will curtail future
legislative flexibility to deal with the problem. 1l2 Allowing attorneys to profit
from unlawfully-obtained funds may make it easier for them to become deeplyinvolved with crime families as ongoing advisers, a characteristic already true of
most attorney-crime family relationships.

This also creates the potential for
increased public cynicism toward the legal system.l 13
The right to counsel "cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.'"114

That crime family defendants have as compelling a right to

counsel as anyone else is not disputed.

The plan for court-appointed counsel for

such defendants in order to preserve the government's interest in pursuing
forfeiture of attorneys' fees passes muster under the sixth amendment and is
demanded by the high principles underlying RICO.
RICO was enacted in order to make progress in what some have called a
national

war

against

organized

crime.

One

of

the

many

Congressional

investigations leading to the passage of RICO found: "The Mafia is a secret
conspiracy against law and order which will ruthlessly eliminate anyone who
stands in the way of...any criminal enterprise in which it is interested.
destroy anyone...[i]t will use any means available ... "115

It will

The special national

problem of organized crime justified the creation of a statute specifically targeted
towards eliminating that problem. Fulfilling the aims of that statute justifies the

III Caplin and Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 648.

112 Id.
113 Id. at 649.
114 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (citing Hebert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312 (1926».
liS Senate Special Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate
Commerce. Third Interim Report, S. REP. NO. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ISO (1951).
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special scheme of treatment for the terrorist element of society represented by
crime families. whose continued existence demonstrates the need for innovative
application of innovative laws.

Forfeiture of attorneys' fees will enhance the

quality of RICO crime family convictions and will represent a significant
steptoward dismantling organized crime's carefully-cultivated myth of being
un touch a ble.
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KENDRICK V. BOWEN AND THE CHASTITY ACT:
ON THE HIGH WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
by
Cheri Lewis
When Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act l

(AFLA), the so-

called "Chastity Act,"2 it could hardly have intended to make bedfellows of the
di verse

religious

denomina tions

tha t

ha ve

coalesced

to

challenge

the

constitutionality of the Act under the Establishment Clause. The AFLA, the
constitutionality of which the Supreme Court will decide this term, was a federal
grant program designed to address the social ills of adolescent pregnancy and
premarital relations by allocating funds to various charitable, religious, and
voluntary organizations to provide counselling and teaching of adolescents.
Suit was brought in 1983 to challenge the "Chastity Act" by the director of
the Virginia American Civil Liberties Union after he learned of a program run by
the Catholic Diocese of Northern Virginia in Arlington 3. Since then, the AFLA
has united such disparate groups as the American Jewish Congress, the National
Organization

of

Women,

Methodist

ministries

from

Northern

Virginia

and

Richmond, Planned Parenthood, and Americans for Religious Freedom in an effort
to have the Act invalidated.

In May of 1987, the U.S. District Court for the

District of Columbia did just that in Kendrick v. Bowen,4 which the Supreme
Court has taken on direct appeal. 5
Enacted

in

1981, the

AFLA

was

a

$30 million-a-year

grant

program

authorizing a variety of community organizations to counsel and teach adolescents
on matters relating to premarital relations and pregnancy.

The Act sought "to

find effective means... of reaching adolescents before they become sexually active,"
I 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1982).
2 The original Congressional draft of the AFLA bill spoke in terms of
discouraging "adolescent promiscuity" and promoting "chastity." S. 1090, 97th
Con g., 1st Sess. § 1901(a) (Apr. 30, 1981).

3 'Chastity Act' Lawsuit is Pitting Religions
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1988, at I, col. 1.

Against

One

Another,

4 657 F. SuPP. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan.
11,1988).
5 The Supreme Court has taken this case because an Act of Congress was
struck down as unconstitutional. Appeal Pending, No. 87-253, (1988).
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"to

promote

adoption

as

an

alternative

for

adolescents"

and

"to

establish

innovative, comprehensive and integrated approaches to the delivery of care
services for pregnant adolescents .. ."6

Congress had concluded that "legislation, to

foster alternatives to abortion, and to encourage adolescents to bring their babies
to term, serves a critical national interest."7

However, the AFLA contained a

major stipulation that grant payments would be restricted to organizations that
did not provide abortions or abortion counselling or referral and that did not
"advocate, promote, or encourage abortion."S
In Kendrick v. Bowen, the district court found the AFLA in violation of the
Establishment Clause of the first amendment 9 under the tripartite test of Lemon
v. Kurtzman,lO the traditional test applied in such !=hallenges. lI Judge Richey's
opinion held that, while the Act carried a valid secular purpose of addressing
problems caused by teenage pregnancy and premarital sexual relations, both on its
face and as applied, the AFLA had the primary effect of advancing religion and
therefore violated the Establishment Clause. 12
Moreover, because many
organizations receiving benefits from the AFLA have a religious character and
purpose, and the activities they were involved in were counselling and education,
often provided in small groups or on a one-on-one basis, Kendrick concluded that
the

degree

of

government

monitoring

necessary

to

prevent

grantees

from

advancing religion would create "excessive entanglement" between government and
religion. 13
In addition to the fact that Kendrick has created a schism among various
religious organizations, this case is noteworthy because it presents a number of
ancillary constitutional issues offering alternative grounds for invalidation of the
AFLA's program scheme.

Although it is not likely that the Supreme Court will

examine these issues, this article will endeavor to review them after an evaluation
6 42 U.S.C. § 300z(b)(1)-(3).
7 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. I (19S1).
S 42 U.S.C. §300z-10(a). . This section of the Act provided an exception to
this restriction, stating that "any such program or project may provide referral
for abortion counseling to a pregnant adolescent if such adolescent and the
parents or guardians of such adolescent request such referral...." [d.
9 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." U. S. CONST. amend. I.
10 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
11 657 F. Supp. at 1556.

12 [d. at 1564.

13 [d. at 156S.
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of the district court's decision of the case under the traditional Establishment
Clause analysis of Lemon.
A VALID SECULAR PURPOSE WITH NO FACIAL "PRIMARY EFFECT"
In

determining

whether

a

governmental

statute

comports

with

the

Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court begins by inquiring whether the statute
explicitly or deliberately discriminates among religious denominations. If it does,
the case must be reviewed under strict scrutiny analysis. 14 This analysis has
been utilized in only a limited number of Establishment Clause cases where a
statute's benefits were to be allocated only among religious organizations and
most often where an intentional, not merely an incidental disparate impact, was
evident.
In Kendrick the plaintiffs below argued that the AFLA should have been
reviewed under strict scrutiny, but the district court properly rejected this notion
because the statute's plan was facially neutral and intended the inclusion of not
only religious organizations, but secular organizations as well.
district court applied the three-prong test of Lemon v.

Consequently, the

Kurtzman. 15

To withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Lemon test, a statute I) must
contain a valid secular purpose, 2) must not have the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion, and 3)" must not foster excessive entanglement between
government and religion. 16 Failure to meet anyone of these three elements may
render the provision unconstitutional. 17
Judge Richey's opinion in Kendrick held that while the AFLA met the valid
secular purpose of providing a means of combating teenage pregnancy and
educating adolescents in sexual matters, it failed the last two elements of the"
Lemon test. 18 Plaintiffs below advanced the argument that the AFLA, when
compared with its predecessor, Title VI of the Public Health Service Act, was a
statute motivated wholly by religious purposes and therefore did not satisfy the

14 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
15 657 F. Supp. at 1557.
16 403 U.S. at 612-13.
17 657 F. Supp. at 1557. Recently, though, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court
has hinted that a regulation which fails one or more of the tests may nonetheless
be held constitutional. See 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
18 657 F. SuPp. at 1570.
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first prong of the test. 19

Yet the district court found, based on the AFLA's
abundant legislative history, that the AFLA possessed a valid secular purpose. 20
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the district court found that, on
its face and as applied, the statute had the "primary effect" of advancing
religion,21 and thus, the AFLA impermissibly violated the Establishment Clause.
That "primary effect" finding of facial invalidity appears to be based on only two
narrow determinations: the fact that the legislative history of these provisions
demonstrated that Congress clearly intended religious organizations to participate
in these programs as both grantees and as unpaid participants22, and the factthat
the statute contained no explicit restriction against the teaching of religion qua
religion. 23
Congress' expressed intention

to include

religious organizations in the

provision of AFLA services and counseling appears to be the primary basis for
Judge Richey's decision.

Relying heavily on the fact that the AFLA required

applicant groups to describe how they "will, as appropriate in the provision of
services .. .involve religious ...organizations: 24 the district court concluded that "the
statutory scheme is fraught with the possibility that religious beliefs might infuse
instruction ... and [t)his possibility alone amounts to an impermissible advancement
of religion."25
As appellants argue, simply reqUlrlDg such information to be provided by
each applicant cannot, without more,· be viewed as statutorily compelling religious
involvement. 26 The authoritative Senate Report 27 states that "religious affiliation
19 [d. at 1559.

20 Neither the Brief for Appellees nor any of the briefs filed by amici curiae
in support of appellees before argument at the Supreme Court raise this issue of
the Lemon test.
21 657 F. Supp. at 1560.
22 [d. at 1562.
23 [d. at 1562-63. Although the District Court took judicial notice of the
fact that the Department of Health and Human Services' "Notice of Grant Award
applicants to the AFLA stated that grants may not be used to "teach or promote
religion," it nevertheless found this unpublished and unenforceable administrative
warning inadequate to protect against the sectarian use of AFLA funds. [d .. at
1563.
24 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B) (1982).
25 657 F. Supp. at 1563 (emphasis in original text).
26 Appellant's Opening Brief and Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Kendrick v.
Bowen, appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Brief for
Appellant).
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is not a criterion for selection as a grantee.,,28

Moreover, a number of Supreme

Court cases make clear that absent an initial determination that a particular
recipient is "so permeated by religion that the secular side cannot be segregated
from the sectarian,"29 religiously-affiliated organizations may participate fully in
governmental programs. 30
Certainly, the Supreme Court has never held that
theEstablishment

Clause

requires exclusion
pu blicly-supported social programs. 31

of

religious

organizations

Governmental funding schemes for social service programs

from

administered by

religiously-affiliated colleges and hospitals have been upheld in instances where
the aid was shown to be clearly designated for other than a specifically religious
purpose and where it was neutrally available to all types of groups.32

Thus,

programs authorizing non-categorical grants to. private colleges,33 state issuances
of revenue bonds for construction of private college facilities,34 and federal
construction grants for private colleges 35 have been upheld by the Supreme Court,
defying invalidation under the initial "primary effect" inquiry. Indeed, it can be
said that a historical relationship exists between charitable factions of religious
groups and government in the providing of social services. Religious organizations
continue to participate in a variety of programs funded by state and federal
governments including soup kitchens, drug abuse programs, orphanages, nursing
homes, housing, job training, tutoring, school lunches, refugee resettlement, and
foreign disaster relief. 36
The district court opinion in Kendrick suffers from its failure to discuss
analogous Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases involving social program
27 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
28 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Con g., 1st Sess., 15-16 (1981).
29 See, e.g., Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1976).
30 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 199 (1899); Walz v. Tax Comm.,
397 U.S. 664 (1970); Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646 (1980).
31 "[T]he proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program
which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation has
consistently been rejected." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973).
32 Roemer, 426 U.S. at 746.
33 [d. at 736.
34 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
35 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
36 McConnell,
405, 421.

Political and Religious Disestablishment,
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schemes like the AFLA. More specifically, Judge Richey's decision may have been
fortified

by

a

comparison

of

this

case

to

the

factually similar line of
37
SupremeCourt school prayer/moment-of-silence cases
or the line of cases
involving federal funding of questionably religious programs in public schools. 38
Here, Kendrick is distinguishable from a number of these cases as the AFLA
was not directed solely at augmenting secular elements of otherwise sectarian
organizations, but on its face solicits participation by "religious and charitable
organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector" as
well.3 9 The inclusion of religious organizations as participants in the AFLA,
according to its legislative history, was aimed at the general desire to involve the
whole targeted community in the programs. 40
The AFLA's reference to religious groups as potential grantees of the Act's
funds should not warrant invalidation of the statute without a more definitive
showing that the statute's provisions had, under Lemon, the primary effect of
establishing religion. 41 On this point, the district court's opinion, which applies
an

unconventional

"direct

and

immediate"

test

to

this

issue,

is

clearly

inappropriate.
The Supreme Court in Hunt v. McNair 42 articulated the standard for the
"primary effect" prong of the Lemon test.

"Aid normally may be thought to have

a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which
religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in
the religious mission. 43
In Kendrick, the district court chose to apply an apparently less stringent
test for "primary effect" than Supreme Court precedent dictates, asking whether
the statute had a "direct and immediate effect of advancing religion."44

This

inquiry eliminates the need to determine if the purported effect is "primary,n and
37 Such a discussion would have included Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
and Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).

38 See. e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); and
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973). Two other recent and very applicable school cases are Grand Rapids
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
39 42 U.S.C. §300z-5(a)(21)(B) (1982).
40 S. Rep. 97-161, 97th Con g., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1981).

41 See 403 U.S. at 602.
42 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
43 [d. at 743.

44 657 F. Supp. at 1560 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783).
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instead directs the examination to the quality of the effect, regardless of whether
it is "primary."

In an unmethodical way, the district court has reduced the

test'sthreshold requirement of a showing of "primary effect" to a showing of
simply any effect.
Perhaps because it is not obvious that the AFLA's scheme, on its face, had
the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the district court felt more
comfortable in applying the Nyquist test of "direct and immediate." On this point
the district court's decision is weak inasmuch as no Supreme Court case mandates
such a conclusion absent a more purposeful and discriminatory showing on the
face of the statute.
AS APPLIED, THE AFLA ESTABLISHES RELIGION
Following a somewhat haphazard factual review of the case record, the
district court in Kendrick held that the AFLA "creates an explicit connection
between a state-sponsored program, a religiously identified organization, and
either a religiously-inspired curriculum or a classroom replete with religious
symbols"45 and that this interrelationship amounted to a "significant symbolic
benefit to religion."46
The touchstone of findings of "primary effect" in Establishment Clause cases
has been that the law in effect supplies government funds for the teaching of
religion. Where government aid amounts to a subsidy of the religious organization
and the subsidy cannot be segregated from religious activity, the Supreme Court
has declared the subsidy to be unconstitutional. 47 The AFLA was a statute with
a few constitutional strikes against it to begin with.

Although Congress generally

. has the authority to impose conditions in the selection of institutions recelvmg
federal funding under its various spending programs,48 the AFLA program is
exceptional in that it contemplates a large amount ($3 million) of direct funding
to religious organizations. Moreover, the nature of the social service invol,ved, the
teaching and counselling of adolescents, is thought to present particular problems
if agency monitoring of the programs becomes necessary to ensure that funds are
not used for religious ends. 49 In particular, the Supreme Court has noted that, in
certain contexts, a danger may inhere that teachers may abuse an apparently
45 657 F. Supp. at 1566.
46 [d. at 116 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982».

47 Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 372 (1985).

48 See infra pp. 22-25.
49 See infra pp. 19-22; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-20.
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neutral scheme to promote religion. 50

Finally, the Court has repeatedly expressed

a concern that adolescents are highly impressionable and thus are likely to
perceive factors such as instruction at locations replete with religious symbols,
for instance, as a union between church and state. 51
The Supreme Court has previously noted, and one of the appellees in this
case persuasively advances, that there is a special concern where religion is
involved,

albeit

adolescents. 52
that

incidentally,

in

the

teaching

of

emotionally

vulnerable

Particularly in the instant case, where it was clearly contemplated

AFLA programs would target pregnant adolescent women, there is an

inherent danger that religiously-affiliated groups will take this opportunity to
inculcate their religion to young individuals at a vulnerable time in their lives. 53
In essence, the AFLA is program whose purpose is to teach morals, an
objective which carries with it the inherent danger that religion will be used to
instill such morals in these young individuals.

"The Act expressly calls upon

religious organizations to convey certain religious values to minors, not to provide
a service such as passing out breakfast to children.,,54

Indeed, it is the unique

nature of the social services provided by the AFLA that jeopardizes the doctrine
of separation of church and state; the pernicious combination of religious
organizations teaching morality makes the AFLA particularly suspect.
Appellants in this case sharply contest the district court's factual findings
and argue that it relied selectively on a few of the appellees' assertions in
holding that the statute "in effect" established religion. 55 Certainly, the district
court's discussion
arbitrary.

of the

various groups participating in

the

program was

By selectively focusing on a few of the more hyperbolic instances

found during discovery involving sectarian groups, the Court's factual findings
lack any comprehensive review of all the participating organizations. The Court
briefly concludes that the statutory scheme of the AFLA was "fraught with the
possibility that religious beliefs might infuse instruction and ...[that) this possibility
50 Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (1985).
51 Grand Rapids School Dist. V. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
52 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 40 I U.S. 602, 615-20 (197 I).
53 Brief for Appellees and Cross-Appellants at 47-49, Kendrick v. Bowen,
appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. II, 1988) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees).
54 "'Chastity

Act'

Lawsuit

is

Pitting

Religions

Against

One

Another,"

RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1988, at 12, col. 1.

55 Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-5, Kendrick v. Bowen, "appeal docketed, No.
87-253 (U.S. Jan II, 1988).
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alone amounts to an impermissible advancement of religion."56
Pointing

to factually

similar Supreme Court cases

where

instructional

programs involving religious groups with concededly legitimate secular purposes
were struck down. 57 the district court held that if the mere danger of inculcating
religion. especially with adolescents. was considered to be enough in those cases.
that the AFLA must also fail.

Kendrick states. where there is a "possibility that

religious organizations will exert pressure on 'matters sacred to conscience·... it
renders the program invalid."58
The Kendrick decision suggests that the Supreme Court is scrutinizing more
closely, and may be more willing to invalidate. programs which merely present the
danger that religion may be inculcated.

Kendrick reads the Supreme Court's cases

to say that a presumption of unconstitutionality is created by programs where
religiously-affiliated groups are even afforded the opportunity to proselytize and
that such schemes will be invalidated without an ample factual showing that
religion "in effect" was ever established under it. 59

ESTABLISHMENT OF A RELIGION?
Neither the district court nor the Justice Department, as appellee. addressed
the question of whether the AFLA tends to establish a particular religious belief
or practice.

This article suggests that the AFLA's conspicuous stipulation that

only groups which "do not advocate. promote or encourage abortion"60 may
participate denotes a

discrete governmental preference for

certain religious

56 Kendrick V. Bowen. 657 F. Supp at 1563.
57 657 F. Supp. at 1563-64. See Grand Rapids School Dist. V. Ball. 105 S. Ct.
3216 (1985); Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Board of Educ .• 333
U.S. 203 (1948); and Felton v. Secretary of Education. 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984)
a/I'd sub nom .• Aguilar v. Felton. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
58 657 F. Supp at 1563. See also McCollum v. Board of Educ .• 333 U.S. 203.
227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. concurring); Meek v. Pittenger. 421 U.S. 349. 366
(1975); and Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball. 105 S. Ct. 3216. 3225 (1985).
59 657 F. Supp. at 1563.
60 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a) (1982).
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denominations in violation of the Establishment Clause prohibition~61
Perhaps the clearest precept of the first amendment's Establishment Clause is that
one religion may not be favored over another. 62 A statute which endorses a
particular religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share offends the
Establishment Clause.63 Yet the program benefits of the AFLA may only be
awarded to groups which do not currently advocate abortion. Thus, appellees and
amici curiae argue, certain denominations, specifically Catholic, are favored by the
largess of the AFLA.

As such, this provision creates the "specter of the

preferred church."64
Plaintiffs originally established standing in Kendrick by claiming federal
taxpayer status pursuant to Flast v. Cohen 65
clause.
Under Flast, taxpayer
standing is permitted to challenge a congressional statute's constitutionality if the
plaintiff can prove that a "logical nexus" exists between their status as taxpayers
and their challenge to the appropriation. 66 No tangible injury need be shown.
It is conceivable that this case would have been framed quite differently had

it not been brought under taxpayer standing.

Throughout the AFLA's history,

only one group is reported to have been denied participation because it did not
meet the requirements of the controversial abortion restriction.

This statistic is

perhaps attributable to the fact that the facial restriction most likely had the
effect of discouraging any group "tainted" by its prior involvement in abortion
counseling or referral from even applying for funding.

Accordingly, none of the

interested parties to the suit have plead that they had been injured by a denial
of funding in order to sue on other constitutional grounds, e.g., equal protection
or

due

process.

For

this

reason,

and

because

taxpayer

standing

was

available,plaintiffs did not need to assert that the AFLA tended to establish "a

61 Plaintiffs in the original action, B'Nai B'Rith Defamation League,
contended that the AFLA has a tendency to benefit groups affiliated with certain
denominations, namely Catholic ones which oppose abortion under any
circumstances, and exclude others. Members of the Jewish faith do not regard a
fetus as a living person, and therefore do not necessarily oppose abortion as part
of their religious beliefs. Brief for Appellees 25, Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal
docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. II, 1988).
62 "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another," Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228,244 (1982).
63 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985).
64 "'Chastity Act' Lawsuit is Pitting Religions One Against One Another,"
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, March 6, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
65 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
66 Id. at 102-03.
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religion" or' a preferred group, but only that it tended to establish religion in
general.
The AFLA's restriction clause is regarded as the red herring in Kendrick
primarily because it injects the volatile issue of abortion into the case.

As the

district court stated, "The Court ... does not decide any issue related to abortion."67
However, the statute undeniably draws a distinction between organizations which
will and will not qualify according to a criterion which deeply divides religious
groups. This amounts to the establishment of a religion.
In effect, the AFLA endorses those religious organizations which embrace
the religious tenets that premarital sex and abortion are forbidden and wrong. 68
Such a statute, which "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community,·69
offends the Establishment Clause.
On this point, the government argues that abortion is an issue of public
importance, the subject of both secular and theological concern, and that the
Establishment Clause is not violated merely because the issue "happens to coincide
with the tenets of some or all religions."70

Although the government concedes

that abortion is "a central concern of many religious faiths," it argues that
abortion is equally capable of being discussed in secular terms. 71
The Justice Department maintains that the issue is not whether abortion is

capable of being discussed in religious terms, but whether a particular participant
in the program must be presumed to be unable to convey that subject in lawful,
Reasonable men would agree that abortion could be either a
secular terms. 72
secular or a religious issue, depending on the context of discussion.

However, the

genuine legal issue here is whether the stipulation contained in the AFLA,
presuming that abortion may be discussed by religiously-affiliated counselors under
67 657 F. Supp. at 1553 n.3.

68 See Brief of Council on Religious Freedom as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal docketed, No. 87-253
(U.S. Jan. II, 1988).
69 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70 Brief for Appellant at 36, Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal docketep, No. 87-253
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1988) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 421 (1961).
71 [d.

72 Brief for Appellant, supra note 26 at 37-38.

33

the terms of the statute 73 in a secular manner, tends to establish a preferred
religion.

A purely pragmatic examination of the AFLA might also include asking

whether the stated primary purpose of the statute, to address the social ills of
teenage pregnancy and premarital sexual relations, can be fulfilled in the context
of a program which limits discussion of abortion.1 4
Implicit in the government's argument on the abortion issue is that Kendrick
is governed by the Supreme Court cases of Maher v. Roe 75 and Harris v.

McRae,76 which held that the states and the federal government may refuse to
fund medically-necessary abortions in furtherance of an articulated policy of
favoring childbirth over abortion.
The Justice Department, relying on McRae and Harris for the proposition
that a women's right to choose to have an abortion is not a fundamental, freestanding right and that governmental policy preferences may permissibly govern
the allocation of funds affecting this right, maintains that the restriction clause
of the AFLA is permissible.
The Justice Department may be overextending the precedential value of these
two cases in contexts outside the conditional spending jurisprudence, as it is
unclear whether this proposition carries any weight in an Establishment Clause
context. 77 Furthermore, even if Congress is accorded great deference in creating
a spending scheme to address compelling social problems, if it effectually validates
/a preferred social agenda known to be shared by some specific religions or
factions and not others, has Congress in fact established a preferred religion?78
The district court opinion in Kendrick states that "a society is only free
when individuals are left free from direct or indirect pressure to abandon their
own cherished religious beliefs for whatever set of beliefs currently holds
government favor."79

Clearly, the language of the lower court's opinion speaks

73 The condition of the grants are that they be "made only to projects or
programs which do not advocate, promote or encourage' abortion." 42 U.S.C. §
300z-1 O(a)( 1982).
74 See infra, text accompanying notes 92-101.
75 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
76 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

77 Harris was a First Amendment/Due Process case: McRae was a Equal
Protection Clause case. U.S. CONST. amend. I and amend. XIV, 1.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 102-15.
79 657 F. Sup~ at 156~
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not only of the danger of establishing "a" preferred religion,80 but also alludes to
the danger of institutionalizing the moral or secular beliefs of the current
political majority.

Not all religions, nor all people agree that premarital sex and

abortion are wrong or sinful.

To subordinate the will of the individual for the

will of the instant majority on "matters sacred to the conscience" violates the
core prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
POLITICAL ENTANGLEMENT AND DIVISIVENESS
The Kendrick Court determined that the third prong of the Lemon test,
whether the statute fosters an excessive entanglement between church and state,
was satisfied. 81
In appraising excessive entanglement, the Supreme Court
examines three factors:

1) the character and

purpose of the

institutions

benefitted, 2) the nature of the aid, and 3) the nature of the relationship between
the governmental and religious organization. 82 The Kendrick Court found that
because the religious organizations receiving benefits have a religious character
and purpose, and because the risk of abuse with direct monetary grants was
great, that the risk of institutionalization of a religious doctrine could only be
overcome by government monitoring so continuous that it would rise to the level
of excessive entanglement. 83
As noted above,84 the nature of the counseling and instructional programs
under the AFLA is likely to present a danger that religious beliefs will be
inculcated in those taking advantage of the programs.

Based on a number of

Establishment Clause cases, the Court found excessive entanglement because of
the oversight which the program would reQuire. 85 "Unlike a book, a [counselor]
cannot be inspected once to determine the extent and intent of his or her
personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment."86

The entanglement prong of the Lemon test has been the subject

80 "When the power, prestige, financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure on religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
81 657 F. Supp. at 1567.
82 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 615.
83 657 F. Supp. at 1567.

84 See supra text accompanying notes 45-59.
85 657 F. Supp. at 1567-68.

86 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
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of recent criticism, though.

Justice Rehnquist has called it the "Catch-22"

paradox of the Court's creation, citing findings such as Kendrick which state that
the type of program necessarily requires supervision to avoid entanglement, yet
the that supervision itself would cause the entanglement. 87 Another commentator
asserts that the entanglement prong of the Lemon test is largely responsible for
the anomalous· results in many Establishment Clause cases. 88
In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor suggested that the entanglement
prong be replaced by a test that asks whether the government intends to convey
a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion. 89 This new test would
require courts to make a broader factual examination of the history of a program
such as the AFLA and would require more than a showing that a "danger of
establishing religion" inhered in the program.

If applied to the AFLA, this new

test would affirm the district court's finding under the "effect" prong of the

Lemon

test

that

Congress'

scheme

was

one

under

which

certain

religious

affiliations would be benefited.
The entanglement prong has also been viewed by the Court as an inquiry
into whether the program tends to create "political divisiveness."90
least

one

justice

does

not

believe

that

this

is

an

Although at

appropriate

test

for

Establishment Clause purposes,91 the "political divisiveness" that the AFLA creates
is conspicuous. The Act has the effect of "religious gerrymandering" by choosing,
in

restricting access to federal

funds,

to champion one side of a

highly

inflammatory and polemic issue that deeply divides religions. If the AFLA works
to benefit certain religions and not others because of a restriction that is very
politically divisive, religion has in effect been established.
THE CHASTITY ACT AND CONDITIONAL SPENDING
Although

Kendrick

was

not

brought

to

challenge

the

AFLA

as

a

87 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21.
88 Choper, "The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict," 41 U. PITT. L. Rev. 673, 681 (1980).
89 465 U.S. 668, 691-94 (1983).

90 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 796; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
91 Justice O'Connor has stated, "In my view, political divisiveness along
religious lines should not be an independent cause test of constitutionality,"
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 689 (concurring). She has recently added that any
discussion of the entanglement prong should be limited to institutional
entanglement in the nature of the governmental activity, and should not review
the possible political divisiveness that the program creates among partisan interest
groups. Felton, 473 U. S. at 421-30.
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congressional coercive spending case, it raises a few profound constitutional
concerns about such programs. The General Welfare Clause of article 192 confers
on Congress only a power to spend; it confers no express independent power to
regulate. 93 It has long been held that government may not regulate matters
indirectly which it cannot regulate directIy.94
While Congress today has the broad power to choose to subsidize or
otherwise encourage certain activities, its power to discourage or penalize other
activities by attaching conditions or privileges is questionable. In two very recent
cases, the Supreme Court has held that unconstitutional conditions compelling the
surrender of independent constitutional rights are invalid. 95
In FCC v. League oj Women Voters,96 the Court invalidated a provision of
the Public Broadcasting Act that prohibited any noncommercial educational station
receiving public funds from endorsing candidates or editorializing. The Court held
that under the scheme the stations would have to forfeit their first amendment
right of freedom of expression if they wished to receive funding.

The case is

notable because of its treatment of the conditional spending restriction on free
speech as a direct regulation.
The 1986 case of Babbitt v. Planned Parenthood Federation,97 concerned a
state funding program similar to the AFLA.

The state of Arizona appropriated

state funds to pay for family-planning services on the condition that such funds
would not be made available to groups offering abortions, abortion referral or
counseling for abortions.
The state argued that the measure was permissible
98
under Maher v. Roe
as an exercise of a state's right to withhold public funds
from abortion-related services. The Supreme Court, in summary affirmance of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that it was improper to flatly deny

92 "The Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States." U.s. CONST. art. I, § 8.
93 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
94 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), held that a state may not deny
unemployment benefits to a person who refuses to work on Saturday for religious
reasons.
95 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) and Babbitt v.
Planned Parenthood Fed., 107 S. Ct. 391 (1986), aJf'g Planned Parenthood of
Central & Northern Arizona v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986).
96 468 U.S. at 364.
97 107 S. Ct. at 391.
98 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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money to groups which could separate their abortion-related from their nonabortion services and thereby qualify for funding under the program.99
Both of these recent cases stand for the proposition that Congress may not
coercively manipulate constitutionally protected rights by denying funding for
certain programs.

Although the Court's opinion in Babbitt did not address this

point expressly, the fact that it struck down the state's plan in the face of
Maher v. Roe weakens the precedential value of the Maher decision in this
area.I 00 Interestingly, these two decIsions, relied upon by appellants in Kendrick
who assert that these cases squarely stand for the proposition that federal and
state governments may choose to champion childbirth and choose not to fund
abortions, are in question after Babbitt.
Professor Laurence Tribe and other authorities have stated that at the time
it

was

decided,

Maher

seemed

to

ignore all

of the

Court's earlier

cases

establishing that the government's decision to fund a program and not another
may be unconstitutional if its purpose is to discourage the exercise of a
constitutionally-protected right.I 0I If indeed Maher has now been narrowed and
a

woman's

right

to

an

abortion,

whether "fundamental" or

not,

may

not

necessarily be interfered with by the state, Kendrick should also be regarded as
acase which confirms the notion that Congress may not regulate in areas which
affect constitutionally-safeguarded rights of the individual.
If,

through

the

AFLA, Congress

has not

impermissibly regulated

the

constitutional right of a woman's access to groups willing to offer her the
constitutionally-protected right choice to abortion, it has impermissibly restricted
her first amendment guarantees by a content-based regulation of her right of
access to information about sexual matters and abortion.

99 It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
State of Arizona's assertion that funding must be denied outright to groups such
as Planned Parenthood which applied for funds for its non-abortion related
services, but which also provided abortion-related services. The Court found that
it was not "impossible," as the State contended, to monitor through a review of
accounting records, where allocated funds were directed.
789 F.2d at 1351.
Contrast this with the Court's trend in recent Establishment Clause cases to apply
a slapdash answer to the entanglement prong of the Lemon tests. See, e.g., Grand
Rapids School District, 473 U.S. at 398, where the Court treated the issue in one
sentence on the last page of its opinion and Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683-84, where the
issue was mentioned in one paragraph.
100 See supra note 98.
101 Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 332-37 (1985). See
also Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1103, 1142-56, 1158-59 (1987).
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CHASTITY AND RESTRAINT
Although Kendrick was never plead as a first amendment l02 free speech
case, the abortion restriction clause of the AFLA can be scrutinized as a form of
censorship or restraint of free speech. The language of the AFLA states that
"grants may be made only to projects or programs which do not advocate,
promote or encourage abortion."103

Although this restriction primarily serves as

a prerequisite that must be met by groups applying to participate in the AFLA, it
may also be viewed as a prospective limitation on the activities of those groups
which have already received funding.
As mentioned above,104 the Supreme Court in Federal Communications

Commission v. League of Women Voters recently held that federal funds cannot be
denied under a restriction which has the effect of limiting free speech. 105
Likewise, the AFLA

should not be able to silence grant applicants who may

believe that providing information about contraception and abortion, whether or
not this is regarded as "advocating" or "promoting," may be a legitimate means of
preventing adolescent pregnancy, the purported purpose of the Act. The Supreme
Court has stated that "where ... a speaker desires to convey truthful information
relevant to important social issues such as family planning and prevention of
venereal

disease ... the

paramount."I06

first

amendment

interest

served

by

such

speech

is

When viewed in this light, the restriction clause of the AFLA

begins to look much like impermissible prior restraint.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot discriminate in their
subsidies in such a way that "aims at the suppression of [what are seen as]
Additionally, government may not attempt to reduce in any
way the amount of information available to it citizens. 108 Fundamental to the

dangerous ideas"107

first amendment is the notion that government may not forbid the suppression of
ideas which may differ from the beliefs of whatever majority is currently in
102 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
103 42 U.S.C. § 300z-IO(a).

104 See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
105 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1985).
106 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983).
107 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983). See
also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(government benefit designed to suppress a particular point of view with which
the government disagrees is unconstitutional).
108 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
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power.I 09

Yet. the AFLA contains a conspicuous viewpoint-based restriction on

free speech in the form of a condition for federal funds.
In addition to placing a restriction on the speech and activities of the
organizations participating in the AFLA. it can also be said that the Act inhibits
the privacy rights and right of access to information of individuals who seek
counselling through one of these organizations. IIO The Supreme Court. in Carey
v. Population Services International ill held that government may not interfere
with this correlative right of access to information about private decisions.
This speech restriction of the AFLA should be particularly disquieting when
one considers the type of individual whom the AFLA is targeting.

According to

the statute. the AFLA was aimed at adolescents. some pregnant. who were more
.likely to live in low-income communities w1th high rates of regnancy. I 12 Because
of the economic status and youth of the individuals who would benefit from the
AFLA. their needs would render them more vulnerable and their decisions would
be more easily influenced 113.

Additionally. they are less likely to have access.

through other avenues, to accurate information about abortion and contraception.
In light of these facts. free speech concerns should clearly take on heightened
importance where teenage sexual education is concerned. I 14
The Supreme Court may choose to embrace the argument advanced by the
Justice Department here that because government may choose not to fund a
woman's abortion,1l5 it may therefore permissibly choose not to fund programs
which

"advocate"

or

"promote"

abortion.

Even

so.

the

proposition

that

government may choose not to fund a woman's abortion does not grant that
government authority to restrict her access to information regarding that decision,
109 Abrams v. U.S .• 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919) O. Holmes. dissenting).
110 See Brief of Amici Curiae (NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and
National Abortion Rights Action League) In Support of Appellees and CrossAppellants. Kendrick v. Bowen, appeal docketed, No. 87-253 (U.S. Jan. II. 1988).
111431 U.S. 678 (1977).
112 "In approving applications for grants ... the Secretary shall give priority to
applicants who -- 1) serve an area where there is a high incidence of adolescent
pregnancy; 2) serve an area with a high proportion of low-income families and
where the availability of programs of care is low ... " 42 U.S.C. § 300z-4(a) (1982).
113 These decisions may include whether or not to carry a fetus to full term.
114 In Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products, 463 U.S. at 74 n.30, the Supreme
Court said that "the right of privacy in matters affecting procreation applies to
minors ...[and] it cannot go without notice that adolescent children apparently have
a pressing need for information about ·contraception."
liS Under the authority of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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whether that access is or is not publicly funded.
provisions,

to

the

extent

that

they

jeopardize

In this light, the AFLA's
a

woman's

access

to

this

information as well as the first ame·ndment freedoms of groups participating in
the program, are clearly unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in assessing the constitutionality of the Adolescent
Family Life Act, should affirm the ultimate holding of the district court in

Kendrick.

When examined under the traditional test of Lemon, the AFLA should

be found to contain a legitimate secular purpose and should not be held to have
the facial effect of establishing religion.

However, as applied, the statute tends

to establish a religion.
First, because the AFLA sought to provide a social service which involves
teaching and counseling of adolescents on "matters sacred to the conscience," the
nature of the program itself falls into a somewhat suspect class of activity.

The

danger that religion will be inculcated in this setting is great, and the Court in

Kendrick expressly states that the suspicious scheme of this program is a factor
in its holding.

Based on the presence of this danger, the district court, with an

unsatisfactory review of the factual record of Kendrick, applied a less scrutinizing
standard, finding that the AFLA had the "primary effect of establishing religion."
However, the district court's opinion is not necessarily erroneous.
Judge Richey's opinion most likely reflects the sentiment that the AFLA, if
it did not intend to establish religion, provided a program which. enunciated a
valid legislative purpose but was intended to be highly accommodating to religious
interests.

Moreover, in the imposition of an abortion-related restriction on

participant groups, the AFLA further meddled in the religious sphere. In choosing
to deny access to the program's funds to groups which could not guarantee that
they would not promote abortion,

the AFLA

had the effect of "religious

gerrymandering" among religious denominations, based on their particular belief on
this divisive issue.

In this way, the AFLA had the impact of benefitting only

religious and secular organizations which shared the view that discussion of sexual
relations and pregnancy must exclude any advocacy of abortion under any
circumstances.
For purposes of Establishment Clause analysis, the abortion rest/iction clause
is relevant only to the extent that it applies to the third prong of the Lemon
test, excessive entanglement, and that it creates severe political divisiveness
among religions.

If the AFLA were challenged on an equal protection or first

amendment basis, this controversial restriction would provide further grounds for
invalidation of the Act.
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The Supreme Court's

dispositio~

of Kendrick may elucidate the deficiencies

of the Lemon test, in particular the "excessive entanglement" and "political
divisiveness" inquiry, and will most likely refresh the Court's Establishment Clause
analysis.
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VIRGINIA ATTORNEY SANCTIONS:
THE RIGHT STUFF, OR THE BIG CHILL?
by
Mark Raby
INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Congress radically amended Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The new rule, referred to by some as "Rule II with teeth,,,1 makes

the signature of an attorney or pro-se litigant a certificate that the pleading is
grounded in fact, warranted by law (or a good faith argument for its extension,
modification, or reversal) and not interposed for an improper purpose, such as
harassment or delay.2
The amended Rule requires courts to impose sanctions for violations. 3 These
sanctions may include a requirement to pay attorney's fees and other expenses.
From its inception, the new Rule II created a tremendous upsurge in attorney
sanction litigation. 4

lCarter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4
(1985) (stating that the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 was "designed to put teeth
into the old rule").
2 See Fed R. Civ. P. 11.
3 [d.

4 See Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions.
100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631 n.5 (1987).
The new Virginia attorney sanctions rule may provide a bridge to imposition
of sanctions under the federal rule in cases removed to federal court. In the
fourth circuit case of Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 the
court circuit court supported the denial rule II sanctions in a suit filed in state
court and removed to federal court.
The circuit court pointed out that
availability of sanctions under such circumstances may provide an incentive to
remove frivolous suits to federal court.
Later, in Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 816 F.2d 970
(4th Cir. 1987), the circuit court quoted the lower court's statement that Rule II
sanctions are never to be imposed in a case removed from state court "until such
time as the states adopt counterpart rules so that their judges can give litigants
who launch non-meritorious cases the same dose." Although the circuit court held
that dismissal of the Rule 11 motion was error, they did so because the district
court failed to consider sanctionable conduct that occurred after the case was
removed to federal court. Thus, the question of whether Rule II sanctions would
be applied in a case filed in Virginia and removed to federal court since the
adoption of § 8.01-271.1 remains open.
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In 1987 a joint subcommittee of the General Assembly of Virginia brought
their own version of Federal Rule II to the Virginia Code, as part of a
comprehensive package of tort reform. 5 According to the subcommittee, it is the
public perception "that frivolous suits are clogging the court system".6
the subcommittee received

no

Although

testimony or other evidence suggesting such

congestion, they included the provision to "improve public confidence in the
[court] system.,,7
While improving the public image of the judicial system is a laudable goal,
attorney sanctions should be applied with caution. Overly enthusiastic application
of sanctions may "chill" some legitimate advocacy.

Improperly applied, the

provision could also pit lawyer against client in a contest over liability for
sanctions.

This would erode public confidence in the lawyer-client relationship,

and thus of the court system as a whole.
This article begins with a discussion of possible requirements of § 8.01-271.1
by analogy to case law and commentary under Federal Rule II.

Next, the author

examines the relationship between § 8.01-271.1 and the ethical duties of a lawyer
to his client, noting

potential conflicts that could arise

application of the Virginia rule.

through

improper

Finally, the author concludes that must apply

the provision conservatively, or risk erosion of public confidence in the court
system, contrary to the rule's stated purpose.
DISCUSSION

The Certification
1.

Reasonable Inquiry.

Both the federal rule and § 8.01-271.1 require an

attorney representing a party to sign each pleading, written motion, or other
paper of the party.8

Both rules make such a signature certification that, to the

best of the attorney's "knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable
5 JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS
AND THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM, REPORT TO THE VIRGINIA GEN.
ASSEMBLY OF 1987, Senate Document No. II (1987) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT].
6 Id. at 16.
7 Id.

8 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987).
Unlike the federal rule, the Virginia sanctions provIsion also includes oral
motions. Id. This reflects the more informal practice of Virginia district courts,
where much of the practice is based on oral motions. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 16.
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inquiry," it is well grounded in fact and law. 9

Before the adoption of § 8.01-

271.1, a lawyer's duty to ground his pleadings in the law was contained in the

Code of Professional Responsibility.IO

The provision purports to give us an

objective standard to decide what constitutes a frivolous pleading or motion.

It

9 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987).
The full text of the provision reads:
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name, and the attorney's address shall be stated
on the first pleading filed by that attorney in the action. A party who
is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper and state his address.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
him that (i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to th'
best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation. If a pleading, written motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless
it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant.
An oral motion made by an attorney or party in any court of the
Commonwealth constitutes a representation by him that (i) to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
(ii) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed or made in violation
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed the paper or made the motion, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other
paper or the making of the motion, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

[d.
10 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 states that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he
may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Rules of the Virginia
Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, DR 7-102(2) (1987).

Section 8.01-271.1 includes the additional requirement that an attorney not
bring a claim that with reasonable inquiry would show to be legally groundless.
Disciplinary Rule 6-101(1) requires an attorney to "demonstrate the specific legal
knowledge, skill, efficiency, and thoroughness in preparation employed in
acceptable practice by lawyers undertaking similar matters . . . " Rules of the
Virginia Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, DR 6-101(1) (1987). This rule, operating in
tandem with DR 7-102(2), constitutes a reasonable inquiry duty like that imposed
by § 8.01-271.1.
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leaves us, however, searching for a standard.

What constitutes a reasonable

inquiry? A reasonable inquiry of law, according to some courts and commentators
dealing with Rule

II, may

operate on a sliding scale.

In their view the

requirement would vary with an attorney's expertise and access to research
tools. I I
Furthermore, Rule II case law suggests that counsel may have a continuing
duty under § 8.01-271.1 to ensure that a pleading is well founded.

In the Rule 11

case of In re Continental Securities Litigation the defendant claimed that there
was no basis for joining him in the suit.

The court noted that Rule II sanctions

could be proper "if it develops that [the defendant] was included in the complaint
without reasonable basis, or has been kept in this case beyond the point where
his improper joinder should have been evidence [sic].,,12
The question of what constitutes a reasonable inquiry of fact is, perhaps,
even more difficult.

For example, to what extent is a lawyer entitled to rely on

the factual representations of his client?

Some commentators analyzing the

federal rule suggest that a lawyer must always seek independent verification of
his client's representations. 13 This view finds some limited support in case law.1 4
Other writers disagree, framing the question as whether it is reasonable to rely
solely on the client's word.1 5 These writers suggest several factors to use in
determining whether it is reasonable to rely on the client's word, including the
client's basis of knowledge, length of association with the lawyer, and cost of
seeking corroboration.1 6 The latter view, which focuses on the reasonableness of
an attorney's actions, is more efficient.

It saves the client the expense of having

II See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (noted access to LEXIS), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
See also Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule 11 - a Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181, 194 (1985).

12 No. 82-C-4712 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 1984) (WESTLAW, DCT database, 1985 WL
3296) (emphasis added).
.
13Marcus, Reducing Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact 0/ The Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules 0/ Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363,
365(1983); See also Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
GEO. L.J. 1313, 1319 (1986) (suggesting that an attorney must make an
investigation if it can prove or disprove the client's representations).
14 See Coburn Optical Indus. Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 6iO F. Supp 656, 659
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (Holding that the requirements of Federal Rule II are not
satisfied where an attorney relies on his client's assurances that facts do or do
not exist, when a reasonable inquiry would reveal otherwise).
15 See Rothschild, Fenton, & Swanson, Rule
Investigate, 11 LITIGATION, Winter 1985 at 13, 14.
16 [d. at 14.
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11:

Stop.

Think

and

his own representations verified when the attorney has good reason to trust their
veracity.

2.

Improper purpose.

Section 8.01-271.1 imposes sanctions on an attorney who

brings an action for purposes of harassment or delay.17

Since the provision is

framed in terms of motive, it calls for the courts to inquire into the state of
mind of the attorney when the action was instituted. Some courts considering
Rule 11 have avoided employing such a subjective standard by inferring improper
purpose from a violation of the objective portion of the rule.
Thus, a court may find improper purpose if reasonable inquiry (the objective
standard) would have disclosed that the action was not well grounded in fact and
law.
In Hudson v. Moore Business Forms. Inc. 1S the court employed this
reasoning in imposing Rule

11 sanctions on defense counsel for groundless

counterclaims. The Hudson court said that the lack of reasonable justification for
the sanctioned firm's claims raised "a strong inference that the defendant's motive
in bringing the counterclaim was to harass the plaintiff and to deter similar
actions from being brought.,,19
The objective standard can also guide consideration of the "good faith
argument for extension, modification, or reversal" exception to the requirement
that a pleading be based on existing law. Without reasonable inquiry into existing
law (under the objective standard) one cannot make a good faith argument to
change it.
The sanctions provision will no doubt be attractive to lawyers, since it can
be a powerful litigation tactic.

Some lawyers may hope to persuade opposing

counsel to nonsuit a borderline claim with the threat of a sanctions motion.
Lawyers, however, must take care in employing the provision.

A motion for

attorney sanctions not grounded in law and fact, brought with improper motive, is
itself subject to sanctions under § 8.01-271.1.

Sanctions
By increasing the range of sanctions at a judge's disposal, §

8.01-271.1

becomes a tool for more flexible docket management. For example, suppose that a
Motion for Judgment 20 , the pleading which initiates an action at law in Virginia,
is not well grounded in fact or law.

Without the sanctions provision, a judge

sustaining a demurrer to such a pleading has only two options. The judge
could allow amendment if the defects could be cured.
17 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987).
18 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
19 Id. at 484.

20 See Rules of Virginia Supreme Court 3:3 (1987).
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If the plaintiff does not,

or cannot, fix his pleading, the suit would be subject to dismissal.
While this system allows one with a valid claim to overcome defects of form,
it leaves unpunished those who, while having a valid claim, do not make a
reasonable inquiry into fact or law before filing their initial pleading. Under the
new provision, sanctions may be levied on those responsible:
both.

Attorney, client, or

Applied correctly, this flexibility would allow more efficient and fair case

management.

For instance, a court may punish an attorney for abuses of the

system, while allowing his client's cause to proceed.

As the author will argue in

part II(C) of this article, improper application could result in a
battle between attorney and client over liability for sanctions, which would have
a deleterious effect on the system as a whole.
While the provision makes sanctions for violation mandatory,21 the type and
severity of punishment is left to judicial discretion. 22 The law allows for the
award of expenses and attorney's fees, but does not mandate them.

Indeed,

criticism alone may prove a powerful sanction. Publication or dissemination of an
unfavorable sanctions ruling may tarnish the public and professional reputation of
an attorney.23
Some courts have shown great creativity in fashioning sanctions under the
federal rule.

In Heutt;g & Schromm v. Landscape Contractors Counci/,24 the

court awarded $5,625 in attorney's fees to the defendant union, specifying that no
part of this penalty was to be paid by the client. 25 Furthermore, the court chose
to publish the highly critical opinion, and required that a copy be distributed to
each lawyer in the sanctioned firm. 26

21 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987).
22 Id.
23 See Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 201 ("Judges are prone to forget the
sting of public criticism delivered from the bench.
Such criticism, while
potentially constructive, can also damage a lawyer's reputation and career . . .
There is a distinction between bad practice and lack of integrity.").
24 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), a/I'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
25 Id. at 1522.

26 Id. at 1522-23; See also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (requiring decision to be shown to all
attorneys in firm); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 512, 514 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(requiring dissemination of decision to all Assistant United States Attorneys in
the Northern District of California engaged in similar litigation).
It is interesting to note that Articles by Judge Schwarzer, caution judges
about the potentially harmful effects of such dissemination, despite his own
frequent use of such sanctions. See Schwarzer, supra note 23.
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Ultimately, the type of sanction imposed may turn on a judge's view of the
purpose of sanctions.

The subcommittee

report

speaks only

in

terms of

deterrence,27 a function which is served whether the provision is applied as an
economic or punitive measure.
Professor Arthur Miller, reporter to the advisory committee that fashioned
the new federal rule, supports the economic justification of such a sanctions
provision.

Although the federal rule (like the Virginia law) speaks of sanctions,

Professor Miller asserts that it is "in reality ... more appropriately characterized
as a cost-shifting technique" to redistribute the cost of litigation between the
parties or their attorneys.28

Professor Miller feels that the sanctions are merely
an economic incentive for lawyers to "stop and think" before pursuing claims.29
Judge William W. Schwarzer of the Northern District of California views the
federal rule as a punitive measure. 30 "The rule provides for sanctions, not fee
'shifting"

writes Judge Schwarzer, "[ilt is aimed at deterring and, if necessary,

punishing improper conduct rather than merely compensating the prevailing
party."31
This latter view is more likely to be adopted by Virginia courts.

If viewed

as a cost shifting tool, sanctions are likely to be an effective deterrent only to
the extent that they outweigh the benefit of sanctionable conduct.

For instance,

some lawyers may make a motion designed to cause delay if they believe it is
worth the monetary cost of having to pay attorney's fees.

Without the stigma of

punishment, sanctions will do little to remedy the unfavorable public impression of
the court system as the legislature intended.
If the sanctions are to be viewed as punitive, they should be applied with.
extreme caution.

Overzealous implementation of § 8.01-271.1 could harm the

relationship between lawyer and client, and chill zealous representation of the
client's claim.

27 See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT at 16.
28Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil
Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 34.
For a more complete discussion of the views of Professor Miller and Judge
Schwarzer on the purpose of Rule 1 I see Nelken, supra at n. 13.
29 Miller & Culp, supra note 27, at 34.
Some writers suggest that making sanctions more palatable by portraying
them as mere cost-shifting provisions will make them more likely to occur. See
Nelken, supra note 13 at 1323-24.
30 See Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 185.
31 [d.
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Potential for Damage
Part of the burden of enforcing the sanctions provision rests on the
attorney.

He is responsible for examining a client's claim before proceeding. The

legislature, by deliberately including attorneys among those who can move for
sanctions,

made them partly responsible for detection and punishment of
32
violations.
Thus, the sanctions provision reinforces the attorney's role as an

officer of the court.

A stringent application of the provision may bring the

attorney's duty to the system into conflict with his duty as an advocate.

This

section compares an attorney's duty under § 8.01-271.1 to his duty as advocate
(largely contained in Virginia's Code of Professional Responsibility) and argues
that both should be considered in interpreting the sanctions provision.
1.

Chilling Zealous Representation.

The sanctions provision imposes a duty on

the attorney to refrain from employing claims and defenses not grounded in fact
and warranted by existing law. 33 Furthermore, the lawyer has an ethical duty to
evaluate his client's claim, and to inform the client if the claim has a limited
chance of success. 34 In some part these duties of a lawyer to client and court
overlap and reinforce each other.

Courts must remember, however, that today's

frivolous claim is tomorrow's law.

Courts must carefully weigh the possibility of

squelching legitimate advocacy before applying sanctions for advancement of a
legal argument.
Sanctions for incorrect legal judgment are likely to fall, as they should, on
the lawyer. 35
Over-application of such sanctions may stifle legal creativity.
From fear of economic loss and injury to reputation, many lawyers will decline to
represent clients with novel or disfavored claims.

Thus, the pressure at the

boundary of existing law that is responsible for the development of legal doctrine
may cease to exist.
Yet this pressure must exist if a lawyer is to properly serve his client.
Although driven back from the courts by potential sanctions, lawyers are urged
forward by ethical considerations.

While stringent application of § 8.01-271.1 may

discourage some borderline factual and legal assertions; EC 7-3 encourages a
lawyer, in his role as advocate, to "resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the
bounds of the law."36

Courts must also be wary of applying the wisdom of

hindsight when examining pleadings.

Discovery may prove invalid a claim that

32 See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT at 16-17.
33 [d.
34 See, e.g., Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, EC 7-5 (1987).
35 See Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
36 Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, Pt. 6, § II, EC 7-3 (1987).
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seemed well grounded in fact when filed. An attorney in this predicament should
voluntarily nonsuit,37 but even that won't shield him from sanctions.

The

provision . focuses on the signing of a groundless pleading, not the continuous
wrong of pressing an ill-founded claim. The court should examine whether at the
time of signing 38 reasonable inquiry would have shown the pleading or motion to
be groundless (or that the lawyer continued to pursue it after discovering it was
groundless).
This inquiry requires particular restraint on the part of judges in the
context of the "grounded in fact" requirement.

Neither lawyers nor judges can

determine the sufficiency of alleged facts without examining the plausibility of
legal arguments that organize them into a claim. 39
A set of facts, while
insufficient under existing law, may be adequate when coupled with a plausible
argument for a change in the law. 40 Before courts recognized the doctrine of res

ipse loquitur, a plaintiff had to make a direct showing of causation to recover
Since the adoption of the doctrine, it is only necessary to show
that the instrumentality of the harm was in the defendant's contro1. 41

from negligence.

2.

The Lawyer-Client Relationship.

Candid, open communication between

lawyer and client is in best interest of the lawyer, the client, and the system as
a whole. Among the obvious benefits from a policy of candor is the reduction of
frivolous litigation. As previously noted, a lawyer should advise his client when a
claim stands little chance of success. 42 Conversely, a client should apprise his
lawyer of all relevant facts, even if they are unfavorable to his claim.

Such

communication should reduce the number of groundless actions filed.
Aggressive application of sanctions can damage the lawyer-client relationship
and stifle such candor.

The sanction provision allows apportionment of sanctions

between lawyer and client.

A lawyer being sanctioned for pressing a novel, yet

potentially successful claim could conceivably avoid sanctions by showing that he
advised the client against proceeding.

Similarly, a lawyer could likely avoid

37 See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-380 (1984). This statute has been construed to
confer upon a plaintiff the absolute right to one nonsuit. A first nonsuit under
complying with this section cannot be blocked by opposing counsel nor the court.
Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 237 (1984).
38 Or at the time of making of an oral motion, as provided for in Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1987).

39 See Note. Plausible Pleadings:
Developing
Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 637 (1987).
40 [d.
41 [d.

42 See EC 7-5 supra note 34.
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Standards

jor

Rule

11

sanctions for a pleading not grounded in fact if it can be shown that he was
misled by the client.
The preservation of client confidences and secrets is an important part of
the

attorney-client

relationship.

However.

Virginia's Code

of Professional

Responsibility provides that a lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets necessary
to defend himself against an accusation of wrongful conduct. 43 Thus. an attorney
may expose client secrets or his own work product to shift sanctions· to the
client.
An erosion of trust will occur as clients learn about the potential use of
their secrets by attorneys to avoid sanctions.
less candid with their lawyer.

As a result. they are likely to be

Also. lawyers wishing to limit their liability for

ill-founded legal arguments are likely to become more conservative in evaluating a .
client's claims. This may also limit client candor. encouraging clients to withhold
information detrimental to their case.

The tension created by over-applied

sanctions. would affect the relationship of attorney and client to the court as
well.

Courts could unwittingly discourage disfavored claims as lawyers seek to

avoid sanctions.

Sanctions may be deliberately employed by some courts to clear

overloaded dockets. since the court may impose sanctions sua sponte.

Courts

abusing sanctions as a case management tool may effectively remove from client
and attorney the decision of whether to test a claim in court. and vest it in the
judge.
CONCLUSION·
The stated goal of the legislature in providing for attorney sanctions is to
improve public confidence in the court system. 44 · With that goal in mind. courts
should be wary of over-applying such sanctions.

To do so would create tension

between a lawyer's duty to zealously represent his client and his responsibility as
an officer of the court.

Many lawyers. fearing censure and economic loss. would

not resolve that conflict in favor of the client.

This may further erode public

confidence in the attorney-client .relationship. and thus of the court system as a
whole.
To promote confidence in the system. courts must use sanctions as a scalpel.
not as a bulldozer.

Courts must use discretion in finding violations of the

provision and. fashioning punishment.

A broad reading of the sanctions provision

would create a disincentive to some legitimate advocacy and limit access to the
courts.

Therefore. Courts must cut away frivolous claims and defenses carefully.

43 Rules of the Virgin.ia Supreme Court. Pt. 6. § II. DR 4-101(C)(4) (1987).
44 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT. supra note 7. at 16.
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or risk chilling the zealous representation that drives the adversary system. and
ensures continued development of the law.
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